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NOTES
RAISING THE BAR TOO HIGH:
MOSELEY V. V SECRET CATALOGUE, INC. AND
RELIEF UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK
DILUTION ACT
Amy E. Pulliam'

Trademarks are used to identify and differentiate a product from the
products of competitors.' The distinctiveness and advertising capability
of a trademark are invaluable to the usefulness and effectiveness of the
mark.' In today's market, companies heavily rely on trademarks to
develop brand loyalty, because advertising plays a vital role in consumer
decisions.'
J.D. Candidate, May 2005, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author would like to express her heart felt gratitude to Cynthia Nelson for her
guidance in developing this Note.
1. Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling A way of the RationalBasis
for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 790 (1997). Additionally, in a time
when consumers recognize trademarks more than the actual producers of the goods,
trademarks are used to indicate a "common (though anonymous) source of ownership
o

such as a product line." ARTHUR R. MILLER & MICHAEL H. DAVIS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT IN A NUTSHELL 179 (1983).
2. MILLER & DAVIS, supra note 1, at 179. Trademarks are vital in the field of

marketing because "[t]he consumer may prefer a certain product not because the
trademark has identified a source whom the consumer values, but because the trademark
itself has a certain value." Id. Protecting trademarks from dilution is sensible because
A [famous] trademark seeks to economize on information costs by providing a
compact, memorable, and unambiguous identifier of a product or service. The
economy is less when, because the trademark has other associations, a person
seeing it must think for a moment before recognizing it as the mark of the
productor service.
Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 75 (1992).
3. Klieger, supra note 1, at 790-91. Klieger emphasizes trademark value, stating, "a
trademark is that which makes tomorrow's business something more than an accident."
Id. at 791 (citing UNITED STATES TRADEMARK ASSOCIATION, TRADEMARKS IN
ADVERTISING AND SELLING 1 (1966)). The owner of a trademark should have the

authority to protect the advertising value of its mark, as consumers associate the mark
with the product being advertised. John F. Hacking, Trademark Dilution: Setting the
Dilution Standard Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 5 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 115, 117 (2003) (citing I J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
AND UNFAIR COMPETITIONS 2:1 (4th ed. 2000)). The Restatement of Unfair Competition

explains that the commercial value of a highly distinctive and unique trademark is due to
its strong association to the goods, services, or business that it identifies. RESTATEMENT
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Because the success of a company's product may hinge on consumer
recognition of its trademark, it is important to prevent competitors from
trying to create similar looking marks to ride on the original's coattails.
In a 1927 groundbreaking article, Frank Schechter emphasized the
necessity of anti-dilution laws and their role in safeguarding the
uniqueness of trademarks.4 Prior to the enactment of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), trademark laws protected consumers
from confusing similar trademarks through traditional claims of
trademark infringement and unfair competition. In 1995, Schechter's
vision materialized when Congress enacted dilution laws to provide the
owners of famous trademarks with remedies in situations other than
traditional trademark infringement.
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 (1995).

In a 1942 opinion, Justice Frankfurter

further emphasized the power of a trademark by stating:
If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by
them. A trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to
select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he wants. The owner of
a mark exploits the human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the
atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol.
Patrick M. Bible, Comment, Defining and Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U.
COLO. L. REv. 295, 299 (1999) (quoting Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942)).
4. Frank 1. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L.
REV. 813, 831-32 (1927). Professor Schecter attempted, but failed, to create a federal act
which would include dilution as a cause of action. Julie Arthur Garcia, Trademark
Dilution: Eliminating Confusion, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 489, 491 (1995). The next change
to the 1905 Trademark Act did not occur until the 1946 Lanham Act, which did not
provide a remedy for dilution. Id. at 491-92. In fact, the Trademark Act would be
amended once more, in 1988, again without any provision for dilution. Bible, supra note 3,
at 301-02.
5. 2 TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5A.01 [1] (Matthew Bender &
Company, Inc. 2003) [hereinafter TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE] (discussing
the distinction between trademark infringement laws, which protect the public from
"confusion, deception and mistake," as compared to anti-dilution laws, which serve a very
distinct purpose of only protecting the private right of the famous trademark owner to
maintain the uniqueness of its mark). In addition to the anti-dilution laws protecting a
private interest, as opposed to the public interest, they protect only a narrow group of the
private sector, leaving the "more numerous journeyman trademarks that dot the landscape
to the more traditional infringement remedies, at least until they become 'famous."' Id.
Prior to the enactment of the FTDA, some courts reluctantly relied on state anti-dilution
statutes, finding no recourse under federal law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION cmt. b (1995).
6. Hacking, supra note 3, at 115; TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE supra
note 5, § 5A.01 [4][a]. The United States Trademark Association stated, "[f]amous marks
are most likely to be harmed by reduced distinctiveness. They are enormously valuable
but fragile assets, susceptible to irreversible injury from promiscuous use." Id. (quoting
The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and
Recommendations, 77 T.M.R. 375 (1987)).
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Trademark dilution occurs when a third party uses the identical mark
or a similar mark, thereby taking away from the distinctiveness of the
original mark.' Dilution may impair the selling power of the original
trademark by blurring or tarnishing the mark." Blurring occurs with a
mark's use on numerous products, diminishing the mark's ability to
identify its owner's product.9 Tarnishing occurs when consumers
associate a mark with an unsavory or lower quality product."'
7. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996)
(stating that "[t]he term 'dilution' means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services"). Id. The American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language defines dilution as "[tJhe process of making weaker or less
concentrated."
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2000), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/61/60/D0226000.html.
As an example of a highly distinctive
trademark and a non-distinctive mark, or descriptive trademark, compare Kodak as a
mark for cameras with Ivory as a mark for products made from elephant tusks. Shannon
M. Sidie, Note, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act-Infringing on Infringement Law?,
36 SUFFOLK L. REV. 451, 454 (2003). Kodak is a coined or fanciful word, which has no
meaning other than as a trademark, and is therefore automatically granted trademark
status. Id. On the contrary, Ivory directly describes the product it is identifying, as the
products are made from the ivory tusks of an elephant. Id. Descriptive terms, such as
Ivory, are never distinctive, and therefore do not enjoy trademark protection until they
have acquired distinctiveness. Id. at 454-55. Otherwise non-distinctive trademarks can
acquire distinctiveness through advertising, "whereby the public recognizes the mark as an
indication of its source." Laurinda L. Hicks & James L. Holbein, Convergence of National
Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 769, 776 (1997). A mark which is originally weak and descriptive (such as Ivory)
can "become a celebrated and famous mark that the public associates with the [product or
service]." Ringling Bros. Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson
Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 481 (7th Cir. 1988). In this case, the district court
acknowledged that although Ringling Brothers' slogan, "The Greatest Show on Earth,"
was originally a weak and descriptive term, thereby not entitled to trademark protection,
it eventually became famous through its sustained use in the market. Id.
8. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2000),
overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). The FTDA
aims to "prevent ... forms of dilution by 'protect[ing] the trademark owner from the
erosion of the distinctiveness and prestige of a trademark caused by ... a proliferation of
borrowings, that while not degrading the original seller's mark, are so numerous as to
deprive the mark of its distinctiveness and hence impact."' Id. (alteration in original)
(citing I11.High School Ass'n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247 (7th Cir. 1996)). The
Restatement recognizes that trademarks are "the law's recognition of the psychological
function of symbols." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 (1995).
Much of the importance of trademarks, particularly with respect to famous marks, is the
effect they have on consumers purchasing products. Id. § 25, cmt. a.
9. Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 466, (citing Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Hensen Prod., Inc.,
73 F.3d 497, 506 (2d Cir. 1996)). Blurring is further described as a loss of distinctiveness
due to the mark's association with other companies' or owners' products. Edward
Vassallo & Tila Duhaime, Supreme Court Tightens Trade Mark Law, MANAGING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (May 2003). Blurring is more likely to harm products that
"through their high degree of distinctiveness or through their owner's extensive
advertising, create a 'positive response that is associated exclusively with the goods or
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The FTDA amended the Trademark Act of 1946" in an effort to focus
attention on the protection of famous trademarks.'2 In interpreting the
express language of this amendment, a split in the circuit courts
developed.' 3 The specific phrase "causes dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark" challenged the courts to decide whether the statute
required a showing of actual dilution.' 4 The Second, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits' interpretations of the statute determined that no actual harm
must occur to gain relief under the FTDA.'" In contrast, the Fourth and
Fifth Circuits interpreted
the statute rigidly to require a showing of
6
dilution.'
actual
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc.'7 to resolve the growing disagreement among the courts
services of the trademark owner."' Bible, supra note 3, at 305 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. c (1995)).
10. Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 466 (citing Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,
1326 n.7 (9th Cir. 1998)). Tarnishing can be further defined as a mark's loss of uniqueness
due to its connection with "lewd or unsavoury goods or services." Vassallo & Duhaime,
supra note 9. A landmark example of tarnishing occurred in Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini
Rising, Inc., when the defendant created a poster employing the phrase "Enjoy Cocaine,"
in a manner which looked nearly identical to the super-famous Coca-Cola trademark. 346
F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). The court stated that "[Coca-Cola's] good will and
business reputation are likely to suffer in the eyes of those who, believing it responsible for
defendant's poster, will refuse to deal with a company which would seek commercial
advantage by treating a dangerous drug in such jocular fashion." Id. at 1191.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
12. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No., 104-98, §3(a) 109 Stat. 985
(1996). The FTDA added the following language, in part, to the Trademark Act:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity
and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against
another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such
use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such relief as is provided in this
subsection.
Id. (presenting an amendment to section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C.§
1125).
13. See infra parts I.A-I.B.
14. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled in part
by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). The federal statute, unlike its
state predecessors, requires a showing of actual injury to gain relief. Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No., 104-98 § 3(c)(1), 109 Stat. 985 (1996). See also infra
notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
15. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 228; V Secret Catalogue Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 471-76
(6th Cir. 2001), rev'd 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 468.
16. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 464 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214
F.3d 658, 670 (5th Cir. 2000).
17. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
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of appeals.' The particular controversy in Moseley arose when a married
couple in Elizabethtown, Kentucky opened a women's lingerie and adult
novelty store named Victor's Secret. '9 After learning of the store and
attempting to settle the matter outside of court, the well-known lingerie
chain Victoria's Secret brought suit attempting to enjoin the couple's use
of the strikingly similar trademark." The Supreme Court ultimately
sided with the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, interpreting the
language of the FTDA to require a showing of actual dilution rather than
the mere likelihood of dilution.2'
This Note examines the doctrine of trademark dilution in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. This
Note first discusses the relevant background of the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act and the purpose and substance of the trademark antidilution laws. Next, this Note analyzes relevant portions of the Supreme
Court case, as well as the lower courts' decisions that ultimately brought
the controversy before the High Court. This Note then examines the
reasoning of the courts of appeals involved in the circuit split, one side
interpreting the FTDA to require a showing of actual dilution, and the
other finding no necessity for such a rigid interpretation of the Act. This
Note then analyzes, in detail, the Supreme Court's ruling in Moseley and
focuses on the Court's strict and literal reading of the express language of
the statute. This Note also explores the Court's review of state and
federal anti-dilution statutes in an attempt to determine Congress' intent
in writing the FTDA. Next, this Note discusses the likelihood that the
statute is more rigid than intended by Congress, but that the Supreme
Court interpreted the statute based on its express language. This Note
then projects the implications of the Moseley decision, which set the bar
very high for an owner of a senior trademark to gain relief under the Act,
and fails to specify the level of evidence required to show actual dilution.
This Note predicts that the rigid statute will make it nearly impossible for
owners of famous trademarks to gain relief. Finally, this Note asserts
that the statute should be amended to more clearly establish a standard

18. Id. at 421-22, 425-26.
19. Id. at 422-23. Upon first receiving Victoria's Secret's notice, the Moseleys
changed the name of their store from Victor's Secret to Victor's Little Secret. This,
however, was not satisfactory to the famous chain. Id. In fact, Victor and Cathy Moseley
have been running their store under the name Cathy's Little Secret since the district court
enjoined them from using Victor's Little Secret. Moseley, 259 F.3d at 467-68. However,
the Moseleys proceeded with the appellate process in an effort to regain permission to use
their original store name. See id.
20. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423-24.
21. Id. at 433 ("This text unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution, rather
than a likelihood of dilution.").
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for dilution, drawing a distinction between identical and similar marks
regarding the burden of proof.
I. A HIGHER LEVEL OF PROTECTION FOR FAMOUS TRADEMARKS

The Federal Trademark Dilution Act was passed in 1995 as an
amendment to the 1946 Trademark Act. 22 The focus of the amendment
is protecting owners of famous trademarks by allowing injunctive relief
for "dilution of the distinctive quality of the [famous] mark., 23 The
FTDA also set forth specific factors to consider when classifying a
trademark as distinctive or famous.24
A. Strict Interpretationof the FTDA: Requiring a Showing of Actual
Harm

Is Ringling Brothers-Barnum and Bailey Circus' famed phrase the
"GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH" tarnished or diluted by the Utah
Division of Travel Development's slogan "THE GREATEST SNOW
ON EARTH?, 25 This precise question appeared before the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 1999.26 Ringling Brothers began using
the catchy phrase when the circus originated, as far back as 1872,

22. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98,109 Stat. 985 (1996).
23. § 3, 109 Stat. at 985. The Court in Moseley stated that a main purpose of the Act
was "'to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of
the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion."'
Moseley, 537 U.S. at 431 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 2 (1995)). Congress further
expressed its concern over the harm dilution can cause by stating that "'[clonfusion leads
to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will
inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark."' Moseley, 537 U.S. at 427 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995)).
24. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985
(1996). Factors to consider in determining whether a mark is famous include:
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; (B) the
duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services
with which the mark is used; (C) the duration and extent of advertising and
publicity of the mark; (D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which
the mark is used; (E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which
the mark is used; (F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas
and channels of trade used by the marks' owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought; (G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar
marks by third parties; and (H) whether the mark was registered under the Act
of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register.
Id.
25. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
26. Id.
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although the circus did not seek or obtain federal registration until 1961.27
Although the Utah Division of Travel Development (Utah) began using
the slogan "GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH" as early as 1962, this suit
did not arise until 1996, after the circus learned that Utah was applying
for trademark registration from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office. 2" The district court, after denying the circus' motion for a jury
trial, found for Utah.2 9
The particular question before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
was whether the district court erred in finding that Utah's slogan did not
violate the FTDA. "' After delving into a historical perspective of
trademark and dilution law, the court compared state and federal
trademark laws to highlight the contrast between the statutes' express
language." The subtle differences in the express language of the state
and federal anti-dilution statutes provided guidance to the court when it
determined whether the federal statute was intended to have the same
burden of proof as the parallel state statute.32 Based upon those semantic
differences, the court concluded that the state statutes sought to protect
marks of distinctive quality against the likelihood of dilution, rather than
the more stringent standard of actual dilution required under the federal

27. Id. Ringling Brothers attracts more than twelve million people a year to see its
show, and including these viewers, more than seventy million people a year see the slogan
"GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH" in connection with the circus it represents. Id.
28. Id. at 451-52.
29. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Va. 1997). Ringling Brothers presented survey evidence that
twenty-five percent of those surveyed in Utah, weighed against forty-one percent of those
surveyed nationwide, linked the incomplete statement "THE GREATEST - ON
EARTH" solely with Ringling Brothers. Id. at 612-13. Ringling Brothers asserted that
this evidence showed that Utah Division of Travel Development's use of the slogan
"GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH" caused people to link Ringling Brothers' famous
slogan with Utah Division of Travel Development's slogan, causing dilution. Id. at 616.
The district court found this evidence unpersuasive because Ringling Brothers did not
demonstrate that "GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH" diminished the ability for
"GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH" to advertise for the circus. Id. at 617. The court
suggested that the evidence might have been more persuasive had it shown that those
questioned "fill[ed] in the blank with SHOW and associate[d] the result with Utah skiing."
Id. Furthermore, the Court stated that more people within Utah (forty-six percent) than
outside Utah (forty-one percent) associated "GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH" with
Ringling Brothers. Id. Ultimately, the court found the survey evidence more persuasive
for Utah Division of Travel Development than for Ringling Brothers. Id.
30. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 452.
31. Id. at 458 (stating that "the federal Act proscribes and provides remedy only for
actual, consummated dilution and not for the mere 'likelihood of dilution' proscribed by
the state statutes").
32. Id.
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statute.33 State laws also focused more on the loss of the trademark's
distinctive nature rather than on the mere economic loss that might
result.1 In contrast, a main concern of the federal statute was the
protection of the trademark's ability to advertise and sell a product or
service.3' The court held that this difference in the express language of
the federal and state statutes was a clear indicator for a rigid
interpretation of the federal statute. 6 Ultimately, Utah prevailed
because Ringling Brothers had not satisfied the high burden of proof
necessary to warrant relief under the FTDA. 37 Specifically, the court
required not only a showing that consumers mentally associated
"GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH" and "GREATEST SNOW ON
EARTH," but also proof that the junior mark economically injured the
more famous mark by decreasing
its advertising value-a burden
38
Ringling Brothers failed to meet.
33. Id. The courts have not had to address what constitutes actual harm in state cases
because the state allows for relief in situations involving a likelihood of harm. Id. Courts,
up to this point, have done one of two things:
(1) assumed that its essential elements-mental association, causation, harmcould be found (or rejected) as fact by inference from a balancing of the 'Mead
factors,' or (2) assumed that all those elements could be conclusively presumed..
. simply from proof of the identity or near identity of the two marks.
Id. The Mead factors referred to in the Ringling Brothers case are found in Judge Sweet's
concurrence in the Mead Data case. Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,
Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring). The factors Judge Sweet
found to be vital in evaluating the likelihood of dilution were: "(1) similarity of the marks
(2) similarity of the products covered by the marks (3) sophistication of consumers (4)
predatory intent (5) renown of the senior mark [and] (6) renown of the junior mark." Id.
34. Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458.
35. Id. (stating that "the federal Act makes plain what the state statutes arguably may
not: that the end harm at which it is aimed is a mark's selling power, not its
'distinctiveness' as such").
36. Id. at 458-59. The court admitted that its interpretation was rigid, particularly in
comparison to the pre-existing state statutes, but found such an interpretation necessary
based on the essential differences between the languages of the state and federal statutes.
Id.
37. Id. at 463.
38. Id. at 461. The court agreed with the district court that a claim under the FTDA
required three aspects: (1) enough similarity between the marks to create a mental
association among consumers; (2) an actual showing of harm; (3) economic harm to the
more famous mark and its effect on distinguishing, identifying and selling its product. Id.
at 453. Compare Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 451 (finding that the federal statute required
proof of economic harm, which Ringling Brothers did not satisfy, resulting in summary
judgment in favor of Utah Division of Travel), with Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480 (7th Cir. 1988)
(finding dilution under the lower burden of proof required by the Illinois state antidilution statute). In Chevrolet, a car dealership in Elmhurst, Illinois, began using the
slogan "Greatest Used Car Show on Earth" in both showroom advertisements and
television advertisements. 855 F.2d at 481. Upon learning of Celozzi-Ettelson's slogan,
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Just over a year later, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the Ringling
Brothers court, and required a showing of actual harm for relief under
the FTDA. 9 The case arose from a dispute between a magazine
publisher, Westchester Media Company, and Ralph Lauren's fashion
business, Polo Ralph Lauren (PRL)
In 1997, Westchester bought
POLO magazine, which historically maintained a good rapport with
PRL.41 After purchasing the magazine, Westchester instituted major
changes, including enlisting a new target audience similar to that of PRL
42
and hiring cover models formerly associated with PRL.
After failed attempts to maintain the previously established
relationship between PRL and POLO magazine,43 Westchester filed suit,
seeking a declaratory judgment that the use of the magazine title POLO
did not infringe on the well known Polo trademark of Ralph Lauren and
PRL.44 PRL counterclaimed for trademark infringement, dilution, and
unfair competition. Initially, the magistrate judge entered a preliminary
injunction against Westchester.46 After the trial, the judge made the
injunction permanent, finding that Westchester had infringed upon

Ringling Brothers demanded that the dealership cease use of it. Id. at 482. After the
dealership refused, Ringling Brothers filed for, and was granted, a preliminary injunction
under Illinois state anti-dilution laws. Id. at 481-82. On appeal, Ringling Brothers
prevailed, with the Seventh Circuit finding that the dealership's use of the slogan
"Greatest Used Car Show on Earth" blurred Ringling Brothers' famous mark. Id. at 485.
Ringling Brothers prevailed in the action against the car dealership, but not in the action
against Utah Division of Travel Development, because Chevrolet was brought under
Illinois state anti-dilution laws, as the federal Act did not yet exist. See id. at 482. The
standard under Illinois state law is lower than the standard under the newer federal
statute, allowing a senior user to prevail "if there exists a likelihood ... of dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark." Id. (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 140, § 22).
39. Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 670 (5th Cir. 2000).
40. Id. at 661.
41.. Id. at 661-62. POLO often included PRL advertisements in the magazine, and
included an interview with Ralph Lauren soon after the magazine's launch. Id.
42. Id. at 662. Westchester admitted to buying a customer list from Neiman Marcus,
one of PRL's most valuable customers, as well as hiring Claudia Schiffer, who had been
featured extensively in Ralph Lauren ads, to grace the cover of the launch issue. Id.
43. Id. at 663. There was discussion over a controversy between Westchester and
PRL, as to whether representatives of PRL objected to the new magazine's title prior to
filing suit. Id. Westchester asserted that a representative of PRL gave an encouraging
reaction to a presentation given by the magazine. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 663.
46. Id. The judge required Westchester to issue a public disclaimer pronouncing that
the magazine was not affiliated with Ralph Lauren or PRL. As part of the preliminary
injunction, the judge also required Westchester to inform all subscription holders and
advertisers that it was not associated with Ralph Lauren. Id.
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PRL's trademark.47 Westchester appealed several of the magistrate
judge's findings, including trademark infringement and those relating to
PRL's anti-dilution counterclaim. 8
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, like the Fourth Circuit, found the
statutory language of the FTDA to require a showing of actual harm.9
Under this rule, the court found that PRL had not satisfied the burden of
proof and affirmed the magistrate's ruling against PRL on the dilution
claim."'
B. Lenient Interpretationof the FTDA: Showing Actual Harm Is

Unnecessary
Shortly after the ruling in Ringling Brothers, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit had an opportunity to interpret the FTDA." In

crafting a snack cracker to promote one of its upcoming cartoon
programs, Nickelodeon Television Network inadvertently created an
issue under the FTDA.52
The network contacted Nabisco about
producing a cheese cracker in the shapes of characters from the
television program. 53 The controversy arose because of the similarities in
the fish cracker created by Nabisco and the well-known Pepperidge Farm
Goldfish snack.14 After a failed cease-and-desist order from Pepperidge
Farm to Nabisco, Nabisco filed a complaint seeking a declaratory
judgment that it was not in violation of trademark laws. 5' The district
court found in favor of Pepperidge Farm, granting a preliminary
injunction against Nabisco under anti-dilution laws.5 6
47. Id. As a result of the permanent injunction, the judge required Westchester to
"cease and desist" use of the magazine name. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 670 (concurring with the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the express
language of the federal statute); see Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,
Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 461 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
50. Id. at 671.
51. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled in part by
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (holding that the FrDA requires
actual dilution).
52. Id. at 213.
53. Id. The resulting product was a cheese cracker snack, which came in three
different shapes: a bone, a cat-dog mix, and a fish. Id.
54. Id. The court stated that "[a]lthough we recognize that Nabisco's fish is not
identical to Pepperidge Farm's, the similarity is sufficient to lessen the distinctive aspect of
the Pepperidge Farm Goldfish in the eyes of consumers." ld. at 218.
55. Id. at 213.
56. Id. The court relied upon Judge Sweet's factors from the Mead Data case, and
found that the combination of factors favored a finding of dilution. Id. at 214. See supra
note 33.
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On appeal, the Second Circuit starkly disagreed with the Fourth
Circuit's interpretation of the FTDA. 7 The court focused much of its
discussion on the meaning of the term "distinctiveness."5" In the end, the
court concluded that a mark is distinctive if the meaning of the mark is
not automatically connected to the object or thing being described. 9 The
court declared the Goldfish mark distinctive enough to merit protection
under the anti-dilution statutes6"' because a cheese cracker and the shape
of a goldfish have no logical connection to one another. 6' Having
determined the distinctiveness of Pepperidge Farm's Goldfish, the court
then examined whether there was "dilution of the distinctive quality of
the mark., 6' The Second Circuit, ultimately ruling for Pepperidge Farm,
reasoned that the Nabisco cracker diluted the distinctiveness of the
Goldfish cracker because the products were similar enough to negatively
affect the uniqueness of the Goldfish. 3
The court further discussed why it strongly disagreed with the Fourth
Circuit's reasoning, particularly focusing on the difficulties presented to
the owners of more famous marks in satisfying the burden of proof to
gain relief under the Act.'
The court highlighted the difficulty of
proving actual economic loss by many owners of famous trademarks,
particularly in profitable times. 65 Furthermore, the court speculated that
57. Compare Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled
in part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (not requiring a
showing of actual harm) with Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (requiring a strict showing of actual economic
harm). The Nabisco court construed the FTDA as setting forth five elements to make a
showing of dilution: "(1) the senior mark must be famous; (2) it must be distinctive; (3) the
junior use must be a commercial use in commerce; (4) it must begin after the senior mark
has become famous; and (5) it must cause dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior
mark." Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215.
58. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 215-16 (comparing "generic" words, such as those that name
the thing defined, to "descriptive" words or marks, those that describe the characteristics
of a product rather than the product itself, and further comparing these to inherently
distinctive words, or words which are "'arbitrary' or 'fanciful"' and have no coherent
connection to the goods or services) (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World,
Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir. 1976)).
59. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 216.
60. Id. (explaining the importance of the mark's distinctiveness in recovering under
the FTDA).
61. Id. at 217.
62. Id. at 216.
63. Id. at 217. The court concluded that, "[a]lthough we recognize that Nabisco's fish
is not identical to Pepperidge Farm's, the similarity is sufficient to lessen the distinctive
aspect of the Pepperidge Farm Goldfish in the eyes of consumers." Id. at 218.
64. Id. at 223-24.
65. See id. Regardless of how conspicuous the dilution by the junior user was, if
business for the owner of the famous mark was particularly lucrative at the time of the
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even in situations where proof of decreased profits exists, it may be
nearly impossible to prove that these changes were due to the use of a
similar trademark. 66
In addition to the difficulties the famous owner would face, the court
also examined the hardship the junior user would encounter.
Most
junior users would prefer to know in advance whether they were
violating the FTDA, rather than learning of the violation after
introducing a new product and mark. 68 However, the junior user must
clearly establish its work in the commercial field before the famous
owner will ever bring a claim under the FTDA against the junior user.69
Essentially, the Second Circuit said that harming the advertising value
and the distinctiveness of a trademark were the reasons the anti-dilution
laws and the FTDA were created.70 Therefore, the court disagreed with
the Fourth Circuit and held that relief under
the FTDA did not require a
S • 71
showing of actual economic harm or dilution.
The Seventh Circuit interpreted the statutory language of the FTDA in
a suit between Natural Answers, an Internet herbal medicine company,
and Eli Lilly, a*pharmaceutical powerhouse.7 ' Natural Answers began
advertising Herbrozac, a mood altering drug, as part of its Herbscriptions
line. 73 Eli Lilly immediately protested the use of the mark, stating that it
alleged dilution, it may be impossible to show a decrease in profits and earnings. Id. The
court asserted that "requir[ing] proof of actual loss of revenue seems inappropriate. If the
famous senior mark were being exploited with continually growing success, the senior user
might never be able to show diminished revenues, no matter how obvious it was that the
junior use diluted the distinctiveness of the senior." Id.
66. Id. at 224.
67. Id. (asserting that most junior and new users would prefer to know whether their
new name or mark violated the FTDA prior to launching a business or product).
68. Id.
69. Id. This is detrimental because the junior owner will have to proceed through the
marketplace as if it is not in violation of any trademark law, only to possibly be informed
later that, in fact, it is in violation. See id.
70. Id. at 223-25.
71. Id. (rejecting the Mead Data factors, finding them deficient when applied to the
federal anti-dilution statute). See also supra note 33. Instead, the court laid out a case-bycase analysis, whereby factors would be determined after looking to the particulars of each
case. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 227.
72. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled in
part by Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
73. Id. at 459. HerbenolPM, Herbalium, Herbaspirin, and Herbadryl are also part of
the Herbscriptions line. Id. at 460. The founder of Natural Answers, Brian Feinstein,
reluctantly admitted that the names he chose for his herbal medicines were meant to
remind the consumer of famous drugs used for the same purpose. Id. During his crossexamination, Mr. Feinstein acknowledged that he chose the name Zonk Out for one of his
products because "[he] did not believe that there was a sleeping preparation out there that
was so widely known with a suffix that would call to mind a certain function so as to help
the consumer know that melatonin combined with passion flower and calcium magnesium
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was so similar to the mark of its famous antidepressant, Prozacthorn
(commonly known as Prozac), and filed suit alleging dilution.74 The
district court granted a preliminary injunction to Eli Lilly and ordered
Natural Answers to remove all comments regarding Prozacthorn from its
website. 75 The appellate court discussed the differing opinions found in
the other circuit courts and ultimately endorsed the reasoning of the
Second Circuit.' 6 The court discussed the hardship imposed on the owner
of a famous mark in trying to satisfy the high burden of proof suggested
by the Fourth Circuit. 71 Specifically, the court found it difficult to accept
that the legislature would enact a statute allowing a particular cause of
action while simultaneously making this cause of action so difficult to
prove.78 Eli Lilly prevailed, with the appellate court affirming the district
court's grant of the injunction.78

II. THE SUPREME COURT RESOLVES THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. The Establishmentof "Victor's Little Secret"
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. to resolve the split among the federal appellate courts.""
In February 1998, Victor and Cathy Moseley opened a store named
Victor's Secret in Elizabethtown, Kentucky.'
An advertisement
described the store as selling lingerie, adult novelties, mood lighting,
pagers, and more. 2 After learning of the new store, the well-known
chain Victoria's Secret immediately contacted the Moseleys, requesting
would help them sleep." Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 834, 83839 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (citations omitted).
74. Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 460-61. As evidence of the famousness of Prozac, Eli Lilly
presented an article from the Baltimore Sun, which stated:
Prozac entered the popular lexicon almost immediately after its introduction six
years ago. It's been on the cover of Newsweek and shared the stage with Phil
and Geraldo; it continues to turn up in the monologues of comedians and the
cultural references of the ironic. It's a designer label, a buzzword, a brand name
familiar to not only the 4.5 million Americans who have taken it, but also those
who wonder if they, too, might find a cure for whatever ails them in the little
green-and-off-white capsule.
Eli Lilly, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 837. Eli Lilly also presented evidence of substantial numbers of
hits resulting from computer database searches for "Prozac." Id.
75. Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 461.
76. Id. at 467-68.
77. Id. at 468.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 468-69.
80. 537 U.S. 418, 422 (2003).
81. Id. at 423.
82. Id.
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that they terminate use of the name Victor's Secret, as it was likely to be
confused with the mark associated with the well-known store. 3 The
Moseleys responded by changing the name to Victor's Little Secret.m
The famous chain, however, did not find this change adequate to
differentiate the two names, and Victoria's Secret filed suit against the
Moseleys in federal court."'
The district court found the two trademarks similar enough to cause
dilution under the FTDA.86 Although finding no blurring of Victoria's
Secret's trademark, the court found that the Moseleys' store name
tarnished the more famous mark and therefore diluted the mark's
distinctive qualityY The court granted an injunction, prohibiting the
Moseleys from using their store name.8
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court. 9
The court discussed two specific issues: (1) whether Victoria's Secret's
mark was distinctive; and (2) whether Victoria's Secret was entitled to
relief, even before dilution occurred. 90 In answering the first question,
the court classified the famous mark as "arbitrary and fanciful," and
therefore distinctive, under the terms of the FTDA.9' The court looked
to the legislative history and congressional intent behind the FTDA in
addressing the second inquiry.92 Specifically, in rejecting the holding of
83. Id. Victoria's Secret learned of the new store from an army officer who read the
advertisement and thought the Moseleys were "us[ing] a reputable company's trademark
to promote the sale of 'unwholesome, tawdry merchandise."' Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 423-25. Victoria's Secret filed several claims, including trademark
infringement, unfair competition, federal dilution, and state dilution. Id. The district
court granted summary judgment, dismissing the infringement and unfair competition
claims. Id. at 425.
86. Id. 423-25.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 425-26.
91. Id. at 426 (citing V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 470 (6th Cir.
2001). The Sixth Circuit stated:
[A]lthough the word 'secret' may provoke some intrinsic association with
prurient interests, it is not automatically linked in the ordinary human experience
with lingerie. 'Secret' is not particularly descriptive of bras and hosiery. Nor is
there anything about the combination of 'Victoria's' and 'secret' that
automatically conjures thoughts of women's underwear-except, of course, in
the context of plaintiff's line of products .... [It] is therefore deserving of a high
level of trademark protection.
Id. at 426 n.7.
92. Id. at 427. The Court quoted the House Report: "Confusion leads to immediate
injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the
advertising value of the mark." Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995)).
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the Fourth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit held that a showing of actual
economic harm was not required. 9' The court found for Victoria's Secret,
stating that the Moseleys' store
name diluted the famous trademark by
94
both tarnishing and blurring it.
B. The Supreme Court's Rigid Interpretation of FTDA
In light of the growing split between the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, and
the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Moseley to resolve the question of whether actual harm was
required to show dilution under the FTDA.9 Following a path similar to
that taken by the Fourth Circuit in Ringling Brothers, the Court began
with a historical perspective of trademark law, followed by a comparison
of state and federal dilution statutes.96 The consideration of state and
federal dilution statutes allowed the Court to compare the language used
in each to explore the legislature's intent in drafting the statute.97 State
anti-dilution statutes allow recovery for a "likelihood" of harm, as do
some of the provisions of the Lanham Act. 98 On the contrary, the FTDA
entitles the owner of a famous mark to an injunction if another's use of a
mark or trade-name "causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the
mark." 99 The Court emphasized the difference in word choice between
the two statutes and held that, unlike the parallel state statutes, the word
choice in the federal statute requires a showing of actual dilution.
The express language of the FTDA defines dilution as "the lessening
of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or

93. Id.
94. Id. The Sixth Circuit reasoned:
While no consumer is likely to go to the Moseleys' store expecting to find
Victoria's Secret's famed Miracle Bra, consumers who hear the name 'Victor's
Little Secret' are likely automatically to think of the more famous store and link
it to the Moseleys' adult-toy, gag gift, and lingerie shop. This, then, is a classic
instance of dilution by tarnishing (associating the Victoria's Secret name with sex
toys and lewd coffee mugs) and by blurring (linking the chain with a single,
unauthorized establishment).
V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 477 (6th Cir. 2001).
95. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 428.
96. Id. at 428-34; see Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999).
97. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432-35.

98. Id. at 432.
99.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added).

100. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433. The Court also looked to other places within the text of
the FTDA where Congress used the phrase "likelihood of confusion," to contrast the
absence of similar language when referring to dilution. Id.
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services.""" Applying this definition to the facts before it, the Court
found no evidence that the Moseleys' store name lessened the capacity of
2
the famous trademark to identify the products of Victoria's Secret."
The Supreme Court found in favor of the Moseleys, agreeing with the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits' interpretation of the FTDA, and requiring
actual harm to gain relief under the Act." 3
Although it did not set forth a clear standard to apply in proving actual
dilution, the Court briefly discussed the sufficiency of different types of
evidence."" On one hand, the Court expressly rejected the additional
requirement of a showing of actual economic harm."" On the other hand,
the Court stated that in cases involving non-identical marks, a mental
association made by consumers would not suffice to establish actual
harm. 116 Conversely, the Court suggested that additional evidence may
1 7
0
not be necessary in cases involving identical famous and junior marks.
In addition, the Court set forth the beginnings of a sliding scale for proof
of dilution, pointing out a distinction between identical marks and merely
similar marks.'" This distinction, however, was the extent of the Court's
101. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 4, 109 Stat. 985
(1996).
102. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434. Specifically referring to the officer who brought the
matter to Victoria's Secret's attention, the Court stated that although he was offended by
the advertisement for the Moseleys' store, it did not change his perception of the image of
Victoria's Secret. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 433-34.
105. Id. at 433. In so stating, the Court limited the decision of the Fourth Circuit in
Ringling Brothers, because the Ringling Brothers case suggests the need for a showing of
actual economic harm in all cases, regardless of whether the marks are identical or similar.
See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev.,
170 F.3d 449,460-65 (4th Cir. 1999).
106. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433; see also TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE,
supra note 5, § 5A.01 [5][A] (explaining that the consumer must make such a connection
between the famous and the less-famous mark that the actual value of the famous mark is
reduced, or the uniqueness of the famous mark is lessened).
107. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434. The Court implied:
[P]roof of dilution requires either that a defendant's use by its very nature
reduces the singularity of the famous mark (as when the defendant uses an
identical mark) or that a defendant's use actually reduces the singularity of the
famous mark (by, for example, reducing its selling power, as proven through
surveys or direct financial evidence).
Stacey L. Dogan, An Exclusive Right to Evoke, 44 B.C. L. REV. 291, 315-16 (2003). See
also Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d
Cir. 1989). The court asserted that in some situations, a "lack of similarity alone may be
enough to defeat a dilution claim." Id. (citing Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co.,
746 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1984), which held that the name "King Kong" and "Donkey Kong"
were not similar enough to support a dilution claim).
108. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34.
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guidance on how future plaintiffs should establish proof of actual harm."'9
Although recognizing that the burden of proof for gaining relief under
the FTDA had been raised, the Court defended its ruling on the basis
that increased burdens of proof do not provide appropriate grounds for
ignoring express statutory language.""0
III.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF A RIGIDLY WRITTEN STATUTE

A. Did Congress Set a HigherBar Than Intended for Gaining Relief
Under the FTDA?
The circuit courts presented several varying, yet persuasive arguments
defending their interpretations of the express language of the FTDA."'
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits strictly interpreted the statute and
compared the state and federal anti-dilution statutes and the language
used therein."' State statutes, as well as other provisions within the
FTDA, include statements relating to the likelihood of dilution or
harm."' In contrast, the term "likelihood" is conspicuously absent from
109. Id. at 434. In support of its opinion that a showing of actual harm should not be
required, Victoria's Secret and its amici argue that consumer surveys are generally
untrustworthy. Id. But see Bible, supra note 3, at 295. Bible supports the use of survey
evidence to show actual dilution, stating that such evidence would be "highly probative of
such harm," and therefore useful in federal dilution litigation. Id. at 295-96. Bible asserts
that "a survey that clearly demonstrates actual dilution may be a plaintiff's strongest and
most persuasive evidence." Id. at 314. Realizing the courts' hesitancy in relying on survey
evidence, Bible does caution that surveys must be carefully conducted. See id. at 318-19.
In a case involving the use of survey evidence in trademark litigation, Judge Posner has
stated, "many experts are willing for a generous (and sometimes for a modest) fee to bend
their science in the direction from which their fee is coming." Id. at 318. Furthermore,
Judge Posner emphasized that the courts are often not able to respond accordingly to false
expert testimony and survey information due to the judges' lack of expertise in the
particular area before the Court. Id. (quoting Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Baltimore
Football, 34 F.3d 410 (7th Cir. 1994)). As a result of possible distortions and falsities,
courts are suspicious of survey evidence. Id. Bible guides the practitioner, stating that the
court will likely question the survey evidence in the following manner, considering: (1) was
the population carefully selected and defined; (2) does the sample relied upon accurately
represent the population; (3) was the data accurately acquired and reported; (4) was the
data analyzed using accepted statistical analysis; (5) were the questions asked clearly; (6)
was the survey conducted by qualified personnel; and (7) was objectivity carefully
protected while conducting the survey. Id. at 318-19 (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION 21:493, 102 (3d ed. 1995)). See also supra note 29.
110. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
111. See infra parts I.A and I.B.
112. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel, 170 F.3d 449, 459 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by 537 U.S. 418 (2003);
Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 219 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
113. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34 (discussing that the Lanham Act uses the term
"likelihood" when referring to confusion, mistake, or deception, but not when referring to
dilution of the quality of the famous trademark).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 53:887

the federal statute when referring to dilution. ' 4 The Supreme Court5
found this distinction compelling in determining congressional intent."
The Court ruled that this slight difference in the express language of the
statutes clearly demonstrated that the federal statute required an actual
showing of dilution or harm. ' 6 The Court reasoned that if Congress
intended the statute to cover a likelihood of dilution, it would have used
7
the word "likelihood," as it did in other portions of the very same Act.'
However, looking back to some of the discussions by Congress during
the drafting of the FTDA, it is unlikely that Congress intended such a
rigid rule." 8 Specifically, a House Report stated, "Confusion leads to
immediate injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to
spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark."" 9 This
passage demonstrates that Congress understood the great difference in
impact that confusion and dilution may have on a trademark.2
Furthermore, it reveals that Congress was concerned with the severe
implications that might result if dilution occurred and was allowed to
continue. 2 ' Based on Congress' discussions regarding dilution and the
difficulty famous mark owners have had thus far in recovering under the
Act, Congress did122not likely intend for the bar to be so high to prevail
under the FTDA.
114.
115.

Id. at 433.
Id. at 432-33.

116.

Id. at 433.

117. See id. (suggesting that Congress' use of "likelihood" when referring to confusion,
but not when referring to dilution, implies its intent to require actual harm).
118. Id. at 427 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995)).
119. Id. at 427 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995)). The report also stated that
"[d]ilution is an injury that differs materially from that arising out of the orthodox
confusion. Even in the absence of confusion, the potency of a mark may be debilitated by
another's use. This is the essence of dilution." Brief of Amicus Curiae, The International
Trademark Association, in support of Respondents, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,
537 U.S. 418 (2003) (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (1995)). This portion of the legislative
history is consistent with the express language of the statute. Id. Section Four of the
FTDA clearly states. "[t]he term 'dilution' means the lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardlessof the presence or absence of.
. . likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 4, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (emphasis added).
120. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 427 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995).
121. See id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995)).
122. In the cases before both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, which followed the strict
interpretation requiring a showing of actual harm, the owner of the famous mark lost
because he could not meet such a high standard of proof. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum &
Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 463 (4th Cir.
1999), overruled in part by 537 U.S. 418 (2003); PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d at 671.
In the three cases that reached the Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, which interpreted
the statute more leniently, the owners of the famous marks prevailed, although
temporarily, as each has now been overturned by Moseley. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands,
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B. The Supreme Court Is Forced Into a Rigid Interpretationof the FTDA
The Court recognized that in interpreting the statute literally, it raised
the bar and increased the burden of proof necessary for owners of
famous marks to recover under the Act. 23 However, the Court refused
to allow an increase in the burden of proof to sway its interpretation of
clear statutory language. 24 Under the newly pronounced and narrow
reading of the FTDA, owners of famous trademarks face a more difficult
challenge in gaining relief for trademark dilution for non-identical
marks. 2 ' The Supreme Court did not set forth any specific guidelines for6
1
the lower courts to determine a sufficient showing of actual harm.
However, the Court set boundaries, stating that proof of actual economic
loss was not necessary,127 but that a mere mental association of the two
marks by a consumer would not suffice as proof of dilution between nonidentical marks. 2 8 Absent express guidelines, the burden shifts to the
lower courts to establish a test for a sufficient showing of actual
dilution. 2 9 Under this newly raised burden of proof, it is difficult to
conceive how an owner of a famous mark will recover against a nonidentical mark. Although the Court deemed it unnecessary, one obvious

Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1999), overruled in part by 537 U.S. 418 (2003); V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 472-77 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 537 U.S. 418 (2003);
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2000), overruled in part
by 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
123. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
124. Id. ("Whatever difficulties of proof may be entailed, they are not an acceptable
reason for dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory violation.").
125. See Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-24 (asserting that the Fourth Circuit's interpretation
of the statute would create "uncompensable injury" for the senior user); Moseley, 259 F.3d
at 473 (discussing the Fourth Circuit's own admission that its interpretation in Ringling
Brothers had been exceptionally rigid); Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 468 (stating that the Fourth
Circuit's strict interpretation of the FTDA creates an "impossible level of proof" for
plaintiffs).
126. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434. Instead, the Court vaguely discussed the possible
use of circumstantial evidence, rather than direct. Id. Again, the Court asserted that the
most obvious form of reliable circumstantial evidence is when the senior and junior marks
are identical, suggesting that identical marks should be held to a lower standard of proof
than non-identical marks. Id.
127. Id. at 433.
128. Id. (stating that "[sluch mental association will not necessarily reduce the capacity
of the famous mark to identify the goods of its owner").
129. Many courts, when dealing with both the state and federal anti-dilution laws, rely
upon a series of factors when weighing and determining whether dilution occurred. See
Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Corp., 875 F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet,
J., concurring); see also Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-24; Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 463 (4th Cir. 1999),
overruled in part by 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (all applying the "Sweet factors" found in Judge
Sweet's concurrence in the Mead Data case).
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way to show actual harm is through economic harm. ' - ' However, as
pointed out by the Second Circuit, it may be impossible to prove that any
loss in profits was the result of a diluting, junior mark.' It is unlikely
that the powerhouse of Victoria's Secret could prove that a small store in
Kentucky negatively impacted the selling power of its mark. However, it
is probable that some of Victor's Little Secret's customers are shopping
in their store as a result of the similarity in name to the larger and more
well-known chain.'
Although the Moseleys deny ever hearing of
Victoria's Secret prior to selecting the name for their store,, 33 there are
examples, such as the junior user in the Eli Lilly case, where a name is
selected solely based on its similarity to a more famous mark.3 This
alone shows that companies realize the effects of trademarks on
consumers, and that consumers will more likely choose a product if it
sounds familiar. 35 This also begs the question of whether the Supreme
Court would have decided the case differently had the Moseleys been
planning to open stores nationwide, or advertise nationally. ' It seems
unfair for a smaller store or company, no matter how undersized its
consumer market, to piggyback off of the success of a huge empire that
the FTDA was created to protect. If the Moseleys' store negatively
130. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433. There is a theory that the Supreme Court landed on a
middle ground when settling the disagreement regarding the necessary level of proof. This
theory is based on the idea that "if a plaintiff need not introduce evidence that a famous
mark has suffered an actual loss of distinctiveness in consumers' minds, or a loss of value
associated with such loss of distinctiveness, then the plaintiff can prevail in a FTDA claim
without direct proof of actual dilution." Dogan, supra note 107, at 315.
131. Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-24. See also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
132. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 477 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd 537
U.S. 418 (2003).
133: Id. at 477. The Moseleys claim to have chosen the name because the store was
being kept a secret from Victor's (Mr. Moseley's) former boss. Peter Katz, At Issue
Lingerie Litigation Court Ruling Leaves Large Companies Exposed, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 23, 2003, at C4.
. 134. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 460 (7th
Cir. 2000)
(discussing how the owner of the junior mark admitted he had chosen the name for his
product, Herbrozac, specifically to allow the consumer to relate it to the famous drug,
Prozac, which performs the same function).
135. Id. Judge Learned Hand discussed the importance of trademarks in a 1928
Second Circuit decision, stating:
[A merchant's] mark is his authentic seal; by it he couches for the goods which
bear it; it carries his name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the
owner's reputation,whose quality no longer lies within his own control. This is an
injury, even though the borrower does not tarnish it, or divert any sales by its use;
for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and
another can use it only as a mask.
Bible, supra note 3, at 298 (quoting Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d
Cir. 1928) (alteration in original) (emphasis in original)).
136. Katz, supra note 133.
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impacts just one customer's impression of Victoria's Secret, then in turn,
the Moseleys also negatively impact the uniqueness of the mark- 37
precisely the harm anti-dilution laws were intended to prevent.
Although remanded, Victoria's Secret now has an opportunity to meet
the newly established burden of proof, although its success remains
unlikely. 138

Congress enacted the FTDA to protect owners of very famous and
valuable trademarks.'9 It is highly improbable that these owners will be
substantially affected by a much smaller store or company, such as the
Moseleys' store in Elizabethtown, Kentucky. However, allowing one of
these stores or companies to proceed with such a similar trademark will
likely result in many companies following suit, using names similar to
well known names to gain the benefit of familiarity.' 40 As stated long ago

137. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (discussing Frank Schechter's theory that protecting
trademarks from dilution of their "hard-earned advertising value and selling power" is a
main purpose of anti-dilution laws). In Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., the court
recognized the importance in protecting not only a trademark's relationship to the product
or service it represents, but also protecting the mark itself. 860 F. Supp. 113, 120
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). In Deere, a competing lawn tractor company, MTD, used an altered and
animated version of John Deere's famed trademark in a commercial. Id. The Deere court
stated that "[t]rademarks are symbols-symbols of products and their origins. When a
trademark is successfully employed, favorable associations accrue not only to its
referent-the product or source for which the trademark stands-but also to the
trademark itself." Id. Although this case involved a cause of action for dilution under
New York state law, rather than federal law, it nonetheless demonstrates that trademarks
are a valuable asset for companies, not only in their ability to advertise a good or service,
but also in the value of the mark itself. See id. Companies invest a great deal into their
marks and logos, and aside from preventing blurring and tarnishing of the mark,
trademark owners want to prevent others from altering the mark in any way. See id. As
stated by the Deere court, the holder of a trademark retains the right to prevent others
from altering its mark. Id. at n.14.
138. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434. In fact, the lack of guidance offered as to what
constitutes the required burden of proof "has left large companies wondering what criteria
must be met before the federal law will provide them protection." Katz, supra note 133.
139.

TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE, supra note 5, § 5.01[2][c].

140. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois stated that dilution is:
[L]ike the pollution of a lake. If everyone who pollutes Lake Michigan were
allowed to say its discharge is an insignificant contribution ... and that no one is
really hurt by it, then no polluter could ever be restrained and it is only on the
theory that each pollution, when considered as part of the total population that is
discharged into the lake, is a restrainable act that the whole concept of protection
of the environment through injunctive relief makes any sense.
Brief of Amicus Curiae, The International Trademark Association, in Support of
Respondents at 17-18, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 011015) (quoting McDonald's Corp. v. Gunville, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11106, at *8-9 (N.D.
I11.1979)).
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by Frank Schecter, the "father" of anti-dilution laws, the purpose of such
laws is to protect the uniqueness of a mark, therefore preserving its
selling power. 1' As more and more stores and companies begin using
marks similar to those owned and relied upon by famous companies, the
selling power and uniqueness of their famous marks will likely decline. 42
Allowing this domino43 effect to occur contradicts the purpose and intent
of anti-dilution laws.
C. The Need For a Clearer,Fairer,and More Effective Statute

The Supreme Court stated that the increased burden of proof and the
unlikelihood of gaining relief do not change the Court's responsibility to
interpret a statute as written by the legislature. 1" Congress tied the
hands of the High Court in drafting such a rigid statute. As such,
Congress should amend the statute to create a clearer, fairer, and more
effective law.' 5 First, as discussed by the Court in Moseley, Congress
should establish a distinction between identical marks and merely similar
marks. 46 Dilution may occur with similar marks; however, a higher
141. Schechter, supra note 4, at 830-31.
142. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. In a hearing before the Subcommittee
on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, Chairman Howard Choble expressed concern that there are people and
companies who might take advantage of the fame and status of another's trademark for
their own purposes, to the detriment of the rightful trademark owner. Fed. Trademark
Dilution Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, The Internet, and Intellectual Prop.
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 53 at 1 (2002) [hereinafter FTDA Hearing].
143. H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3-4 (1995) (describing Congress' concern with the
ability of a phenomenon such as dilution to spread).
144. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003).
145. FTDA Hearing,supra note 143, at 5, 8-9, 19. Four experts in the trademark field
testified at this hearing. Kathryn Barrett Park, the executive vice president for the
International Trademark Association, testified that the INTA supports amendments to
the FFDA which would create a clear "likelihood of dilution" standard to gain relief
under the Act. Id. at 5. This position was further supported by Michael Kirk, executive
director of the American Intellectual Property Law Association, Sherry L. Jetter, vice
president of intellectual property of the Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation, and Ethan
Horwitz, a partner at the law firm of Darby and Darby. Id. at 9, 13, 26.
146. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34 (noting that customers making a mental association
between two non-identical marks is not sufficient for a showing of dilution, but further
evidence may not be necessary in cases involving identical marks, as this alone may be
sufficient evidence). Congress should also consider the significance of the junior and
senior mark in competing markets. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 222
(2d Cir. 1999), overruled in part by 537 U.S. 418 (2003). Does it matter if the senior and
junior mark are in competing or non-competing markets? Nabisco argued that dilution
should not be applied to competing marks, as the infringement cause of action is meant to
cover marks in competing markets. Id. at 214. The Nabisco court disagreed, although the
Supreme Court never discussed this distinction. Id. at 222. The Second Circuit argued
that dilution should apply, even when the marks are in competing markets. Id. at 222-23.
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burden of proof, such as that suggested by the Moseley Court, should be
required.' 47 Dilution becomes more probable with identical marks, thus
necessitating a lower standard.' 4" An appropriate standard here would
include the "likelihood of harm" standard, found in many state dilution
statutes. This ensures that the burden is not set too low as to bar other
companies from creating similar trademarks which are not dilutive. For
example, this prevents a situation where a famous mark can prevail
against anyone who has a mark that is only similar, rather than identical
to the famous mark, without some further requirement of proof. 49 An
appropriate amendment would also vary the burden of proof, making it
not only based solely on the distinction between identical or similar
junior and senior marks, but also slightly based upon the inherent and

First, the closer the markets, the more likely dilution and confusion will occur. Id. at 222.
Second, even if this situation would be covered by infringement, the senior user should
have the right to bring any applicable causes of action forward. Id. Claims are not
inapplicable merely because there is another cause of action that would cover the
situation. Id. at 223. Finally, the Nabisco court found that eliminating competing products
from the reaches of the anti-dilution laws might create a "gap in coverage." Id. In other
words, "products might be found too far apart to support a finding of likelihood of
confusion ... yet too close together to permit a finding of dilution." Id. The International
Trademark Association (INTA) agreed with the Nabisco court that use of a similar mark,
even in non-competing markets, should be actionable under federal anti-dilution laws.
Brief of Amicus Curaie, The International Trademark Association, in Support of
Respondents, at 11, Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (No. 011015). Specifically, the INTA discusses that if Kodak pianos and Buick aspirin were used
as identifiers, it would be realistic that some consumers would relate Kodak to both film
and pianos, or Buick to both cars and aspirin. Id. at 11-12, 14-15. This association alone
decreases the marks' ability to act as "exclusive identifiers" of their original products. Id.
at 15. Frank Schechter stated that "[t]he history of important trademark litigation within
recent years shows that the use of similar marks on non-competing goods is perhaps the
normal rather than the exceptional case of infringement." Schechter, supra note 4, at 825.
Schechter discusses several famous examples, including Kodak cameras and bicycles, Aunt
Jemima's pancake flour and syrup, Rolls-Royce automobiles and radio parts, and BeechNut food products and cigarettes. Id. (citing Aunt Jemima Mills v. Rigney & Co., 247
Fed. 407 (C.C.A. 2d 1917); Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 7 F.2d 967 (C.C.A.
3d 1925); Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, 4 F.2d 333 (C.C.A. 3d 1925); Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co., 15 Rep. Pat. Cas. 105 (1898)).
147. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34.
148. Id. at 434. The Moseley Court stated, "It may well be, however, that direct
evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys will not be necessary if actual dilution can
reliably be proved through circumstantial evidence-the obvious case is one where the
junior and senior marks are identical." Id.
149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 Reporters' Note cmt. B.
at 2 (1995), citing Coffee Don's, Inc. v. Coffee Dan's Charcoal Broiler, 305 F. Supp. 1210
(N.D. Cal. 1969) (warning that limits should be placed on the application of anti-dilution
protection, "lest it swallow up all competition in the claim of protection against trade
name infringement").
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acquired distinctiveness of the senior trademark. 5 " If a mark is coined or
arbitrary, the "likelihood of harm" standard should apply, allowing for a
slightly lower burden for inherently distinctive marks. 91' Conversely, the
standard should be slightly more difficult for descriptive marks which

have acquired distinctiveness through use or advertising.
Ultimately,
Congress should amend the statute to allow for relief in some cases of a
likelihood of dilution, particularly in situations of identical senior and
junior marks.'" This amendment would prevent the spread of dilution
discussed by Congress in
the committee meetings leading up to the
54
enactment of the FTDA.'
IV. CONCLUSION

In Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,
the Supreme Court had the
task of interpreting a relatively new statute and resolving a split among
the federal circuit courts.15 Congress wrote a rigid statute, which seems
contradictory to its intent gleamed from the legislative history.'
In
interpreting the Act, the Court was forced to read the language of the
statute literally, and found that the language required a high burden of
proof for plaintiffs seeking relief under the Act. 58 Based on the analysis
used by the Court, such as the comparison of the federal and state
statutes, it is evident that the Court's hands were tied, and it was required59
to interpret the express language of the statute in the manner it did.
However, this unfortunate interpretation will likely make it impossible
for the Act to serve its fundamental purpose, which is to allow the

150. Hacking, supra note 3, at 116. Cases have discussed the difference between
descriptive marks, with a low amount of distinctiveness, compared to "'arbitrary' or
'fanciful"' marks, with a high amount of distinctiveness. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,
191 F.3d 208, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1999). The purpose of the FTDA is to protect owners of
famous marks, whose mark may be greatly harmed by loss of uniqueness or loss of
distinctiveness. Schechter, supra note 4, at 830-31. It is appropriate, then, for the standard
to vary based upon the level of distinctiveness of the mark. Marks that are deemed more
arbitrary and distinctive should be entitled to the "likelihood of dilution" standard, while
less distinctive marks should have a more difficult burden of proof. Hacking, supra note 3,
at 116.
151. See supra note 146.
152. See supra note 7.
153. See supra note 145.
154. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
155. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
156. Id. at 428.
157. See supra Part III.A.
158. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 434.
159. Id. at 432-33.
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owners of famous trademarks recourse for dilution of their mark."'
Based upon statements made by Congress during the drafting of the Act,
this strict result was not its intention, and therefore, the statute should be
amended to reflect congressional intent.'6 ' In amending the statute,

Congress should set forth exactly what is necessary to allow recovery for
dilution, drawing a distinction between identical and similar marks, as
However, until the
well as inherent or acquired distinctiveness. 16
enactment of an amendment, the owners of famous marks have a
difficult task ahead when attempting to prevail against junior users who
may be diluting the advertising value of the famous mark.

160. Hacking, supra note 3, at 115. Interpreting the Act to require evidence of actual
dilution would cause the act to be "unnecessarily blunted." Id. at 116. Further, "[a]
likelihood of dilution standard more properly sharpens the statute into an instrument of
Id.
protection . .,.161. See supra Part III.A.
162. See supra Part II1.C.
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